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Article 5

Brain-Based Determination
of Death Revisited
by
Eugene F. Diamond, M.D.

The author, a professor ofpediatrics, is a Contributing Editor of the
Linacre Quarterly.

As I understand it, Dr. Alan Shewmon's defection from his
previously held position of endorsing whole-brain death formulations
is contingent on his abandonment of the axiom that the brain is the
central integrating organ of the body. I While his arguments are
cogent and impressively well documented, they are not necessarily
persuasive nor do they seriously undermine the tenability of a
position maintaining that the brain does perform a central integrating
function. This latter position, as Dr. Shewmon points out, is currently
held by the overwhelming majority of physicians including
neurologists 2 as well as an impressive array of theologians3 ,4,5
including the advisers to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences.
The rationale for the acceptance of brain-based determination
of death has been developed elsewhere in a Linacre Institute Paper.6
The authoritative document on the conceptual aspects of the central
integrator doctrine was published in 1981 by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine. 7 The
clinical diagnostic criteria developed by the medical consultants to
the Commission have become the "gold standard" for legislation in
most states abiding by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and the
Uniform Determination of Death Act. 8 The term "brain death" has,
with the continuing development of neurophysiologic and
neuropathologic understanding, become synonymous with total brain
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infarction which is tantamount to destruction of the body's primary
central integrating organ and the loss of somatic integrative unity.
Objective evidence consists in neuroimaging or blood-flow evidence
that total brain infarction has occurred.
Arguments against the Central Integrator theory include the
Hassler experiments. These involve the restoration of consciousness
to comatose patients by artificially stimulating the reticular activating
system through an electrode stereotypically placed in intact basal
gangliar structures. 9 Shewmon refers to these studies as raising the
possibility of having a "conscious corpse" through the stimulation of
the thalamic cortical system in a "brain dead" patient. As I interpret
the Hassler experiments, however, the experimental subjects do not
have the "irreversible cessation of function of the entire brain
including the function ofthe brain stem" which would be required for
the definition of death. Hassler's experimental subjects have intact
cortical and thalamo-cortical systems. If these systems had been
structurally inactivated as they would be in total brain infarction,
consciousness would not be capable of restoration. In fact, Hassler
refers specifically to the studies of McLardylO in which consciousness
could not be restored because the midbrain reticular formation had
been destroyed. The success of the Hassler experiments required an
intact pallium and intact midbrain reticular formation.
Such
structural integrity is inconsistent with total brain infarction and
therefore the possibility of a "conscious corpse" is fanciful and these
experiments do not really seriously undermine "brain death" criteria.
In a similar way, it is difficult to understand why the so-called
"experiments of nature" (upper cervical cord transection or bulbar
paralysis due to Guillain-Barre disease) truly undermine the validity
of the concept of whole brain death. Both diagnoses would involve
discemable electroencephalographic activity. The patient with an
upper cervical transection still has a functioning brain stem
presumably and the bulbar complication of Guillain-Barre disease
almost invariably follows a preexistant polyneuronitis with an
ascending Landry-type of paralysis. From a clinical standpoint, it is
extremely far-fetched to presume that either of these entities could be
confused with whole brain infarction. Imaging and blood flow
studies would likely show an intact central nervous system
circulation. The fact that the intensive care unit can substitute for the
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brain stem by an elaborate scheme of technological assistance for
respiration, blood pressure regulation fluid and electrolyte balance,
parenteral nutrition and pituitary hormone replacement would
reinforce as much as undermine the need for the central integration of
the brain. There is no question that some individuals who fulfill the
criteria for "complete and irreversible cessation of total brain function
including the function of the brain stem" can be kept alive for finite
periods of time with elaborate investments of high technology life
support. There are even times when such support makes eminent
good sense such as in the situation where a "brain dead" woman is
gestating a pre-viable fetus. II The use of brain-based criteria for the
determination of death, in the overwhelming majority of cases is to
facilitate the decision-making process in which continuation of life
support is contraindicated by the realities of the patient's hopeless
prognosis. The various critiques of the validity of brain-based criteria
for the determination of death make very little practical sense except
in the context of a need to disqualify certain donors of unpaired
organs for transplantation. 12 Likewise, the insistence on certain
elaborate and comprehensive criteria for the declaration of death have
very little application to the real world of clinical medicine. Byme l3
for example insists that death must not be declared until there is total
destruction of the circulatory and respiratory systems and destruction
of the entire brain. He even suggests that lack of spontaneous
breathing not be considered tantamount to destruction of the
respiratory system until there is evidence for the disintegration of the
biological capacity for exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide. The
evidence to establish such a state would be so complex and elaborate
that it is questionable that such a determination could be made as a
practical clinical reality. What is obvious is that virtually all patients
declared dead at home or in institutional settings have not yet reached
the point of total destruction of all systems. There is some doubt as
to whether there truly is an entity where the gas exchange function of
the pulmonary tissues manifests itself in a patient on ventilatory
support. Be that as it may, patients are being declared dead routinely
when they stop breathing, when their heart stops beating, or when life
support is discontinued and vital signs cease. This is universally
accepted as proper procedure in a patient whose care is controlled by
Do Not Resuscitate orders, but it would also be the case when
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resuscitation has been attempted without success. The expected
procedure in such cases would be to notify the next of kin that their
loved one is "dead" (not dying) and to transport the patient to the
morgue. Those who interpret death as an event rather than a process
would have to concede that death as a theoretical end point of a
process would not have occurred in most instances where "death" is
declared. Those who hold the view that death is a process would
accept that the death of the organism as a whole would precede the
That is, that not all tissues
death of the whole organism.
simultaneously cease to function and death as a process would be
consistent with persistent evidence of some focal or localized cell
activity. This cellular activity might continue until some thermodynamic endpoint is reached which is incompatible with any vital
process. The rate of progression to this endpoint would vary from
patient to patient depending on the functional reserve of certain vital
organs, the preexistence of debilitative illness, the use of certain
drugs in treatment and other unknown and unknowable factors.
Shewmon l estimates that 20-30 minutes without circulation would be
required but this is an estimate or an educated "guess" by his own
description.
What is being attempted by all conscientious attending
physicians is to know the unknowable, that is the point at which the
soul leaves the body. The overarching desire is to avoid declaring
death before it has irreversibly occurred. However, the unwillingness to acknowledge death when that state realistically occurred
may very well be the predominant fear in the mind of terminally ill
patients and the public at large. 14 The degree of certitude required in
any instance would be influenced by the anticipated removal of an
unpaired organ for transplantation. This is obviously related to the
fact that the donor, if not already dead, will be killed by the transplant
procedure. The dead donor rule requires that the donor be dead
according to existing medical standards which currently would be
"An individual who has sustained - either (1) Irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) Irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain - is dead." (It is noted that this
definition is not reliably accurate in the newborn period.) 15
Whereas the original "Harvard Criteria" may have been
tainted by wish fulfillment for transplant surgeons, 16 it is
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inappropriately pejorative to continue to allege that the current
refined and nuanced definition of brain-based criteria for the
determination of death are merely an "invention" to allow live
patients to qualify as donors. The vast majority of patients declared
dead in a clinical setting will have died as a result of cessation of
respiration and/or heartbeat. The vast majority of patients declared
dead on the basis of "irreversible cessation of total brain function,
including the function of the brain stem" will not even be candidates
for organ donation but rather patients in whom discontinuation of
artificial life support is contemplated.
The rationale for declaring patients dead on the basis of brainbased criteria will not be persuasive for all physicians caring for
terminally ill patients. The majority of individual physicians who
accept such criteria are not less "pro-life" than the minority whose
consciences demand more rigid and vitalistic criteria, and it is a
calumny to allege that they are. In fact, the National Right to Life
Committee, the American College of Pro-Life Obstetricians, the
American Association of Pro-Life Pediatricians, The National
Commission on Human Life, and Americans United for Life all have
expressed agreement with brain-based standards for the determination
of death. 6 The debate about brain death should be elevated to what it
truly is - that is a scientific dialogue about the significance of
certain irreversible losses of function. It is not a debate pitting
predatory transplant surgeons and cynical grave robbers against a
small embattled minority of purists and "legitimate" protectors of the
sanctity of human life and should not be portrayed as such, even by
innuendo.
Dr. Shewrnon comments on the favorable reception given by
audiences at international meetings to his disenchantment with brainbased criteria for the declaration of death. I It should not be inferred,
however, that the rejection of brain-based criteria is necessarily a call
for stricter standards. Several of the authorities quoted by Dr.
Shewmon are on record in the literature as proposing that since total
brain death does not bear meticulous scientific scrutiny, that we can
therefore assume that neocortical loss of function is equally valid in
qualifying donors.17 Specifically, there has been a call for the
recognition that patients in the so-called persistent vegetative state be
qualified to donate organs for transplantation despite their having
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brain stem function. This is, of course, merely a pennutation of the
well-orchestrated effort (at one time endorsed by the American
Medical Association Counsel on Ethical Affairs) to allow the
donation of unpaired vital organs from "brain absent" anencephalic
newborns. 18
Dr. Shewmon correctly states that the medical community has
fallen into the logical fallacy of accepting that absence of evidence of
conscious activity constitutes evidence of absence.
Recent
of
retained
experimental studies indicating irrefutable evidence
function of the neocortex in patients in persistent vegetative states l9
reinforces this reality. Even in patients in whom the cerebral cortex
is physically missing, this fallacy can be demonstrated. Dr. Shewmon
points to his experience with hydranencephaly in which children who
lack cerebral development can yet demonstrate conscious interactive
activity. I have had a similar experience in my own practice with a
hydranencephalic child. During the AMA annual meeting in 1996,
the AMA Council on Ethical Affairs held a hearing on the subject of
anencephalic donors. There was dramatic testimony from a woman
who was the grandmother of an anencephalic child as well as an
educator with a Ph.D. in Child Development. This woman described
her ability to elicit evidence for conscious abstraction ability in her
grandchild who survived six months under close observation and
stimulation. Both conditions, hydranencephaly and anencephaly can
demonstrate significant plasticity in neuronal development. The
experience with these allegedly "brain absent" infants as well as our
burgeoning experience with suppressed conscious activity in
comatose adults strongly recommend against neocortical death as a
standard.
British neurologists have maintained that the essence of
"whole-brain" death is "brain stem" death since it is in the brain stem
(including the hypothalamus) that somatic functions are integrated
and consciousness is controlled by way of brain stem activation of
cerebral hemispheres. The work of Pallis20, 21 in particular has
endorsed brain stem death as the "physiological kernel" of brain
death and the validity of declaring death on the basis of the evaluation
of six critical brain stem reflexes plus the apnea test. Byrne and
Nilges22 have advocated extending the definition of brain stem death
to the evaluation of fourteen reflexes plus the apnea test. In
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evaluating loss of function, the critical distinction between intrinsic
irreversibility of loss of function (physical destruction) versus
extrinsic irreversibility (intact structure) must be preserved. 1 Whole
brain formulations which included destruction of the pallium and
diencephalon would enhance the reliability of the determination of
death as compared to brain stem death.
The major impediment to the acceptance of brain-based
standards for the determination of death drives from the field of
cardiac transplantation. The reluctance to remove a "beating heart"
from a donor declared dead on the basis of irreversible cessation of
total brain function is largely intuitive and related to the ancient
tradition of equating the end of life with the cessation of heartbeat.
The need to overcome the powerful aversion to the removal of an
actively beating heart among members of the transplant team has led
to the development of the "Pittsburgh Protocol" and other procedures
for the establishment of "non-heart-beating" cadaver donors.23
Numerous transplant centers throughout the country are now adopting
strategies for 1) the anticipation of impending cardiac failure 2)
undertaking measures to guarantee proper organ perfusion and
preservation, and then 3) declaring death after two minutes of
asystole. Dr. Shewmon has entertained a modification of the
Pittsburgh Protocol to allow for twenty minutes of systole prior to
removal of the unpaired vital organs. 1 In either event, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the protocol is more for the benefit of the
spectators in the transplant team than for the donor. The ceremonial
awaiting of a cardiac basis for declaring death would not necessarily
improve upon the intellectual honesty or the respect for human life
inherent in the acceptance of brain-based standards. Disclaimers to
the contrary, the Byrne standard or the new Shewmon standard would
effectively end 90% of all human organ transplantation, and possibly
100% of unpaired vital organ transplantation. This would not be an
unacceptable price to pay if the result were to be the restoration of a
societal respect for the sanctity of human life that had somehow been
lost in the acceptance of whole-brain death as tantamount to death of
the person.
I believe that respect for the sanctity of human life and the
declaration of death by whole-brain standards are not mutually
exclusive. If total destruction of the circulatory and respiratory
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systems plus total destruction of the whole brain were to be
scrupulously observed as the sine qua non of declaring death, respect
for life would not necessarily improve since the logistical problems
created in end of life decision making would be monumental. The
small margin of increased certitude about the factual occurrence of
death would be achieved at the expense of clinical chaos at the
bedside. Most current polls indicate that 70% of lay people and 50%
of physicians already endorse the concept of doctors killing patients
through assisted suicide. 14 Any system which would increase the
public perception of futile vitalism or ineffective technological
intrusion into the determination of death might well be counterproductive to the preservation of respect for end of life patients. It
might also be a handicap in the crucial battle against euthanasia.
In the words of Rabbi Immanuel Jacobvits, "If human life has
infinite value, then any small fraction of human life has infinite value
since any small part of infinity is still infinite." No live person should
be treated as dead until truly dead. Death should not be declared until
(a) the spontaneous functions of the heart and breathing have ceased
or (b) there is irreversible arrest of all brain activity. This is the
standard currently accepted by the majority of physicians including
Catholic physicians. It is a position enunciated in the Charter for
Health Care Workers 24 which was derivative of the Pontifical
Academy for Life and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
The discussion of the issue of determination of death should continue
in an atmosphere of mutual respect and a search for the truth.
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